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s an early modernist in a sea of medievalists (and where but
at Kalamazoo could one use that phrase?) I would like to
focus my brief remarks today on Sue’s contributions to a
basic, and yet surprisingly feminist, historical task: periodization.
I realize in doing this that I am undertaking a very old fashioned
sort of women’s history—the “contribution” school—but we are
here to honor and celebrate Sue, so this is fitting.
As most of you know, Sue joined the editorial team
of Becoming Visible: Women in European History on its second
edition, in 1987. Both this edition and the first edition, which
had appeared a decade earlier, included Joan Kelly’s path-breaking
article, “Did Women have a Renaissance?” Kelly’s essay led
historians of women in many fields to question the applicability
of chronological categories derived from male experience.1 We
asked whether women had an Athenian Golden Age, an Age of
Jacksonian Democracy, an Enlightenment, a frontier. Thirty
years later, the questioning continues, augmented by doubts about
whether chronological categories derived from the experience of
some women can be applied to women’s history as a whole, or
whether change that is generally seen as only tangential to gender
relations should qualify as a major turning point. Such doubts
arise in part from questions about “women” as an ontological
category, and the close attention paid to multiple axes of
difference in women’s and gender history.
These doubts have led some historians to stress
continuities rather than ruptures. In their survey of European
women’s history, A History of Their Own, for example, Bonnie
Anderson and Judith Zinsser discuss peasant women from the
ninth century to the twentieth in a single section. Judith Bennett
has long advocated questioning the “master narrative of a great
transformation in women’s lives between 1300 and 1700.” She has
recently broadened her focus and called for an emphasis on longterm continuities, particularly what she terms the “patriarchal
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equilibrium,” across all periods, not simply across “the great
divide” of 1500.2
But is something lost, if in their sensitivity to differences
among women (and perhaps their desire to make women’s history
less depressing), feminist historians refuse to apply structures
of periodization? If a primary (some would say the primary)
contribution of historians to the scholarly and larger worlds is the
analysis of change over time, what happens if women’s and gender
historians step back from this task? Does this make women’s and
gender history “motionless,” a word used by the French Annalesschool historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie to describe European
history over the longue durée stretching from the eleventh century
to the nineteenth, in an article that appeared the same year that
the first edition of Becoming Visible did?
I would (and do) argue that it does, and in this Sue’s work
has been essential in shaping my ideas. In “Fashion’s Captives:
Medieval Women in French Historiography,” now more than
twenty years old, Sue pointed out that in some Annales school
works—a historical school Natalie Davis has termed a “sodality
of French brothers”—women are, in fact, the perfect example
of motionless history. They are viewed primarily as part of a
household, serving as a means of exchange between families. She
notes: “By such formulations gender for women, if not for men,
was assumed to be a historical constant, not a dynamic category
that changed in Europe’s formative centuries and changed again
with the transition into modern times.” This critique is similar
to that voiced more recently by feminist historians of India such
as Tanika Sarkar and Kamela Visweswaran, who take Subaltern
Studies and much of post-colonial scholarship to task for viewing
actual women largely as a type of “eternal feminine,” victimized
and abject, an essentialism that denies women agency and turns
gender into a historical constant, not a dynamic category. I am
not sure if Sarkar and Visweswaran have read Sue’s work, but
they should.3
Criticizing periodization or its absence has thus been an
important part of women’s and gender history, but critique will
only take us so far. Along with demolishing or disassembling the
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chronological structures that have given history shape, we also
need to build new structures of periodization that take gender
into account from the start and not simply stir it in later. In
this we have some not very good examples, including Lawrence
Stone’s idea about the change from “open lineage” to a “restricted
patriarchal nuclear family” to a “closed domestic nuclear family,”
and Thomas Laqueur’s notion of a change from a “one sex”
to a “two sex” model of gender differentiation.4 Stone’s idea
has been rejected as overly simplistic, but Laqueur’s remains
influential, though more so among non-specialists than among
people who actually know something about the history of science
and medicine, who have rejected it as far too dichotomous and
teleological.5 (I don’t need to tell you how important medieval
historians have been in this critique.)
But we also have a very good model. In her essay “The
Dominion of Gender, or How Women Fared in the High Middle
Ages,” first published in the second edition of Becoming Visible
and then revised for the third, Sue describes the centuries from
the eleventh to the fourteenth as a time when “gender became
an increasingly inflexible category for organizing thoughts about
society” in which notions of polarity between woman and man
were first used by theologians “to explain to themselves why
the creation of man alone was not enough in God’s benevolent
scheme.” These notions gradually became “generally accepted
commonplaces,” and shaped the more complex political and
commercial institutions developing in Europe at this point. This
group knows very well that Sue has not been alone in asserting
the importance of the restructuring of the gender system in the
High Middle Ages, for many others who provided support for
this argument (as well as revisions, modifications, and nuancing)
are here, or their spirits are hovering over the room. But Sue
links this directly to issues of periodization, noting: “The loss
of rights accompanying the triumph of a rigid polar construct
of gender constituted an important transition for women, and it
forced substantial changes in their lives. Certainly for women this
era represented as great a change as the Renaissance represented
for men later. Women lost ground in the increasingly complex
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institutions that could enforce a rigid code of gender and in the
commercial centers where authority over resources concentrated
into fewer, largely male, hands.” Women’s experience bears
earlier and clearer witness than does the experience of men to
the West’s transformation into a complex civilization during the
medieval centuries.
These few sentences pack in five primary points: 1. the
history of women does have periods of significant change 2. these
are different than those for men 3. these are related to those for
men. 4. these are not the same for all women 5. these intersect
with other transformations. I can’t think of how one could
formulate the insights of feminist periodization more concisely
than Sue does, though I’ve certainly seen them formulated more
long-windedly.
The stress on difference and diversity among women,
and the more explicit focus on gender, has made the task of
periodization harder, no matter what era we study. We no
longer look for a golden age for women, judging periods by
whether “women’s status” rose or fell in them. (A friend of mine
wonderfully calls this the Glinda-test, from the scene in the
Wizard of Oz when Glinda asks Dorothy whether she is a good
witch or a bad witch. In earlier Glinda tests, classical Athens,
the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment were bad witches, while
the Iron Age and the Merovingians were good witches.) We
don’t assume there are single points of transformation, when,
for example, medieval became modern. (Or at least I don’t read
arguments about whether Hildegard of Bingen or Margery Kempe
or Margaret Fell Fox was the first modern woman, the way I
used to read arguments about whether Dante or Luther or Oliver
Cromwell was the first modern man.)
Even though periodization is now more complicated,
we can still use Sue’s five-point schema to help us think about
change—and continuity—over time. This task is particularly
important for us as feminists interested in the premodern period.
First, it might help sway the remaining troglodytes who doubt
the centrality of gender as an essential category in history. More
importantly, it might convince our students and colleagues—
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many of them in gender and women’s studies programs—that
interesting things did happen in the distant past (that is, before
the invention of television). We need to spread the word
—and in this I agree with Judith Bennett rather than disagree
with her—that differences created by time are just as dynamic,
problematic, and fascinating as those created by any other axis
of difference—and what better way to do this than to engage in
vigorous debates about what times mattered, and why?
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
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beginning of “modern” sexuality to the late nineteenth century, however. See
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